



COUNTERPOINT

A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures

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THE KGB's FESTIVAL

The World Youth Festival, scheduled to take place in late July in Moscow, is of great importance for the Soviet Politburo. Soviet specialists on Active Measures will make a major effort to manipulate the activities of hundreds of young people from the free world countries who will be present at the Festival for the dramatic enhancement of anti-US and anti-NATO propaganda in all continents.

From our many years of experience as members of Soviet intelligence organs, we can confidently predict what much of the planning of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence (KGB) will entail.

Lists of the most active Soviet dissidents are compiled. During the Festival, all of them will be detained, either locked up in jail or under house arrest.

KGB technicians are thoroughly checking the audio bugs installed in all the hotel rooms where the foreign delegates will stay. Bugs are also installed at every table in restaurants which will be used to feed the foreign crowd. At this moment the KGB is working together with the Soviet Youth Organisations Committee (one of the International Department's fronts) to finalize plans and draw up charts as to where each delegation will stay. This is to allow the KGB time to install the most sophisticated bugging devices in the rooms of delegates from the USA, Great Britain, France, and certain other Western countries - regardless of whether the delegates are pro-Soviet or not. The

KGB does not trust its own citizens and never trusts foreigners.

The KGB is arranging seminars for the guides and interpreters, the majority of whom are witting or unwitting KGB informers, to coordinate their reporting to the KGB case officers on every foreign delegate. Young KGB officers are being assigned to each busload of delegates so that they will be able to react immediately to any unexpected situations.

The KGB's First Chief Directorate (the external intelligence service) has already sent top secret coded cables to every KGB residency abroad. The cable requires each residency to obtain, through agents in political circles and through semi-overt contacts, information on the political standpoint of the delegation to the Festival. If criticism is intended of the Soviet Union's external policy, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, or its domestic policy, such as the persecution of dissidents, the residency must make every effort to get the position revised in a way favourable to the Soviet cause. The residency has to submit its proposals regarding young academicians, politicians, and businessmen who are already KGB agents. These individuals should be included in the member lists of delegations, or be invited as guests of the Festival, to use their visit to the Moscow Festival as cover for special training in techniques of espionage.

The huge division of the KGB's First Chief Directorate that is responsible for

espionage against foreign countries from the territory of the USSR is also working out its plans regarding the Festival: some time during the events many of the delegates will be approached by 'liberal-minded' Soviet citizens — who are in fact case officers from the First Chief Directorate — who will try to establish close contact with the delegates which can be exploited when the visitors have returned to their own countries.

Because the Soviet leaders are eager to avoid any problems with the Festival, the Kremlin has ordered a Politburo member, Geydar Aliyev, to assume all responsibility for the coming event. Mr Aliyev has had a 26-year career in the KGB, the culmination of which was his appointment as Chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB. He understands what the whole event is about and is fluent in professional terminology.

The other Soviet leader responsible for the Festival is 80-year-old Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and chief of the International Department which is the Politburo think-tank on strategic external policy, Active Measures, the world communist movement and Soviet front organizations. The Politburo will feel more comfortable with the seasoned Ponomarev's guidance of the resolutions and appeals of the International Department's directed show which will start in the last days of July.

HEIR TO SUSLOV

A Moscow Radio broadcast has provided a clue as to who has taken over the important function of senior Party Secretary responsible for ideology and foreign affairs.

This position, held for many years until his death in 1982 by Mikhail Suslov, is one of the key posts in the Kremlin hierarchy. The incumbent controls virtually the entire external propaganda and subversive apparatus of the Soviet State, including foreign Communist parties, front

organisations and 'Active Measures', which, although carried out by the KGB, have to be submitted for approval to the Central Committee (CC) usually through the International Department.

The new man is most probably Yegor Ligachev, a Party Secretary since 1983 who was made a full Politburo member in April this year.

The clue came in a domestic Moscow Radio broadcast on 3rd June announcing a new First Secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Party Committee. This appointment was said to be in connection with the confirmation of G. P. Razumovsky as Head of the Organisational Party Work Department of the Central Committee. This was the post previously occupied by Ligachev, and the fact that he has now relinquished it is a strong indication that he has taken over Suslov's function. Earlier clues have added to this likelihood: for example, *Pravda* of 14th May reported that Ligachev had attended a Central Committee conference of newspaper and magazine editors and heads of information agencies "and other ideological institutions".

Yegor Ligachev (64) graduated as an engineer from the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1943, but a year later embarked on a full-time career in Party work, initially in the Novosibirsk region. From 1961 to 1965 he served as Deputy Head of the CC Propaganda and Agitation Department for the RSFSR before being appointed First Secretary of the important "obkom" (regional committee). He remained there, acquiring Central Committee membership in 1976, until Andropov brought him back to Moscow in 1981 as a CC Secretary to be in charge of Party organisation and personnel appointments. A further indication is expected when the Supreme Soviet Session takes place on 2nd July, at which Ligachev may be appointed Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union. This is a post with no power or responsibilities of its own, but it has traditionally been held by the senior Party Secretary for

ideology/foreign policy as it enables him to meet high level foreign dignitaries wearing a Parliamentary 'hat'.

THE INDEX OF SOVIET SECRETS

Perechen Svedeniy Sostavlyayushchikh Gosudarstvennyy Taynu is the official name of the 'Index of State Secrets' which tells the Soviet Union's censors what information must be protected as state secrets. The larger volume of the two-volume work is about 400 pages long and covers topics concerning the entire Soviet Union. The second volume, about 200 pages in length, focuses on local matters. The text is not printed but typed and mimeographed on grey paper and bound in cardboard. The Perechen is printed every five years and is periodically updated and revised through supplements that are sewn into the binding.

Every major Soviet censor and selected officials such as KGB 'Rezidents' abroad keep a copy in the office. One journalist who had worked in the Soviet Union for twenty years reported that while the existence of the Index is well known, in those twenty years he had seen the Perechen only once, in the desk drawer of the Deputy Chief Editor of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. On that occasion, he was shown only one page of a supplement which contained a list of dissidents, in alphabetical order, whom it was forbidden either to mention or to quote.

The Index provides guidelines on every topic which the government considers unfit to print. Some of the forbidden topics are:

- The existence of the Perceptron itself

predecessor (conservation organization) located at 7 Kutayskiy Proyezd, almost directly opposite the Hotel Rossiya.

- Nuclear weapon technology and

location of production. The Ministry of Medium Machine Building is responsible for nuclear weapon development and manufacture, liquid fuel rocketry is masked behind "General Machine Building", solid fuel rocketry behind "Special Machine Building".

- The organization of the secret police, in past or present form (OGPU, NKVD, MVD, KGB); location of labour camps; the number of prisoners and executions per year, month or week.
- That the First Section of any Soviet enterprise is the security section and the Second Section is the mobilization component.
- The geographical coordinates of Soviet towns. (Soviet cartographers sidestep this problem by publishing maps overprinted only with major longitude and latitude lines.)
- The location of sensitive installations. (If those are too well-known to be denied, they are administratively 'moved' hundreds of miles to a new location.)
- Embarrassing history such as any mention of 'renegades' like Bukharin, Trotsky, or Tukhachevsky.
- Public health statistics on epidemics, contagious diseases, general mortality and current infant mortality are forbidden. Permanent 'official' mortality rates for cancer and heart diseases have been established and no higher rates may be printed.
- Nothing may be reported on the military except parades, awarding of medals, and romanticized accounts of manoeuvres.
- How much people are paid, especially the privileged. No references are allowed to salaries, dachas, to elite resorts and to the élites' special access stores.

One of the most popular tactics used by Soviet disinformation experts is the use of various devices to employ an eminently respectable Western publication or institution to purvey a pro-Soviet line.

A recent case came to light when it was discovered that a special edition of the *British Oxford Student's Dictionary of Current English*, produced for distribution in the Soviet Union, had altered the definitions of certain key words to suit Soviet Communist ideology.

The Soviet edition produced for the USSR for example defined 'Communism' as: "A theory revealing the historical necessity for the revolutionary replacement of capitalism by Communism", whereas the usual Oxford dictionary definition is: "A theory of society according to which all property should be vested in the community and labour organised for the common benefit". The Soviet edition also describes 'Imperialism' as: "The highest and last stage of capitalism". The usual definitions given by Oxford dictionaries are: "1. The rule of an emperor esp. when despotic. 2. The principle or spirit of empire: advocacy of Imperial interests."

Similarly 'Marxism' is rendered in the Soviet edition as: "A teaching on the main laws of development of nature and society, on the revolution of the exploited masses, on the victory of socialism and the building of Communism: ideology of the Working Class and its Communist Party". The true Oxford definition is: "Pertaining to or characteristic of, an adherent of, the doctrines of the German Socialist Karl Marx (1818-1883)".

Other terms which had been changed in the edition produced for the USSR included Socialism, Capitalism, Bolshevism, Fascism and Internationalism.

The treatment of Bolshevism betrayed a particular Soviet sensitivity to the facts of history which they prefer to gloss over. The usual Oxford Dictionary entry for this word is: "A member of that part of the Russian Social-Democratic party which took Lenin's side in the split that followed the second Congress of the party in 1903, seized power in the 'October' revolution of 1917, and was subsequently renamed the (Russian) Communist party." The

references to the Bolsheviks merely as a faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party and to a "split" were clearly unacceptable, and the Soviet edition shortens the definition to: "A revolutionary Marxist trend of political thought in the World Labour Movement which appeared in Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century embodied in the Proletarian party founded by V Lenin."

A total of 100,000 copies of the 'doctored' dictionary, as well as 70,000 copies of the two-volume *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, similarly altered, were produced and have been available since 1982 and 1983 in specialist hard-currency bookshops in Moscow.

Under world copyright agreements, signed by the Soviet Union, the alterations could have been made legally only with the consent of the Oxford University Press (OUP), and a spokesman for the OUP admitted, according to the London *Daily Telegraph* of 8th April 1985, that the changes had been made in accordance with Soviet wishes, but that the decision was taken at a "low level" in the publishing firm and "just slipped through". He also revealed that the *Oxford Student's Dictionary of Current English* was an important work in foreign publishing terms and he called it "the world's most pirated book".

It is not unlikely, therefore, that the Russians may be trying to distribute their own "ideologically correct" version, masquerading as the real thing, in other countries, particularly in the Third World

STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE

Whatever one's opinion of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) might be, there can be no doubt that the Kremlin has responded with a worldwide Active Measures campaign that is even broader than their 1978 campaign against

the neutron bomb. Just as the Soviets sought to manipulate Western concerns in 1978 to achieve their own foreign policy objectives, so too they are turning to Active Measures to stop, or at least slow, the SDI.

The campaign, begun when President Reagan first made his proposal, soon shifted into high gear to elicit support for the Soviet Union's bargaining position in Geneva. To this end, the Soviets are pursuing a two-tiered campaign to mould the opinions of both the general public and the policy-making élite.

1. In an attempt to play on the fears and legitimate concerns of the general public, the Soviets have generated as many arguments against the SDI as there are identifiable blocs of opinion. The main themes of this effort are easily delineated. According to the Soviets, the SDI would:

- result in a "militarisation of space"
- create an isolated "fortress America"
- be easily countered or technologically impossible to attain
- create a new arms race
- have a destabilizing influence on the superpower relationship
- be so costly that domestic programmes and foreign aid programmes would have to be curtailed.

The main themes of the Soviet anti-SDI campaign contradict one another as well as previous Soviet positions on arms control and international relations. For example, if the SDI is technologically impossible, then America can neither transform itself into a fortress of isolationism nor militarise space. Obviously, the Kremlin assumes that the general public will approach these themes like a menu, selecting one's personal favourite without comparing the menu items for logical consistency.

2. The Kremlin is running a parallel campaign to manipulate the policy makers directly. Not for the first time in the superpower relationship, the Soviets are suggesting that there exists a "window of

opportunity" for arms control.

With the death of Mr Chernenko and the accession of Mr Gorbachev, the Kremlin is suggesting that the West should "give the new man a chance". Now is the time to be flexible in our approach to arms control. The Soviets suggest that it is important to allow the new man a few successes, not only to create a positive climate for international relations, but to strengthen Gorbachev's position vis-à-vis the 'hard-liners'. This persuasive strategy was first tried out after Stalin's death and has since been repeated at each change in the leadership. It has never proved to be more than an exercise in wishful thinking.

Now more than ever, Soviet analysts and insiders tell us that the West must not add fuel to the fire of Soviet paranoia. With the death of Ustinov, the disappearance of Ogarkov and the reduced visibility of the military in ruling circles, it is best not to alarm the 'hard-line' military faction. The West must be careful to give no excuse to the military for suspecting our intentions and motives on the subject of East-West relations. We must seize the opportunity to take a positive stance in the arms control talks in order to avoid giving ammunition to Moscow's 'hawks'. This would give the Soviets a greater sense of security which would inevitably lead to a relaxation of domestic repression and an increase in emigration.

The Kremlin no doubt hopes that between the 'stick' of public pressure and the 'carrot' of increased emigration, it can manoeuvre Western policy makers into softening their positions on arms control in general and the SDI in particular.

SOVIETS EXPLOIT NUCLEAR WINTER THEORY

A controversial study in which a number of US scientists concluded that a nuclear war would destroy all life on earth



by radically changing the world's climate, has been adopted, with some important modifications, by the Soviets. This time it is not just Soviet diplomats, the International Department or the KGB who are trying to manipulate Western fears and concerns, but the Soviet scientific community.

In late 1983 a number of US scientists published a series of articles that claimed a nuclear war would disrupt the earth's climate so severely as to endanger all life on the planet. A few weeks after these articles were published, Soviet scientists involved in their government's nuclear disarmament propaganda campaign adopted the 'nuclear winter' theory as their own.

One of the subjects of the theory is the complexity of the variables involved in nuclear winter scenarios. Many have chosen to exaggerate both the causes and the effects of a nuclear winter for foreign policy purposes. For example, Vladimir Alek-

sandrov, head of the Climate Modelling Laboratory of the Soviet Academy of Science's computer centre, claimed in an April 1984 article published by the Soviet Novosti Press Agency that a blast of only 150 megatons would trigger a new ice age and thus destroy all cities in Europe and North America. The US study, however, was based on a nuclear exchange involving at least 5,000 megatons. Even this figure was considered controversially low in Western scientific circles.

2. If the Soviets are sincerely concerned with the potential for disaster that nuclear winter represents, they should be willing to allow domestic discussion of the theory. Instead, all of their efforts are directed at the United States and the West.

The Soviet government's attitude towards the prospect of nuclear winter is a double-edged sword. It is a tool for propaganda but places the responsibility for the prospect of nuclear winter only on NATO and the United States. Nobel prize winner Andrei Sakharov was the first Soviet

scientist to examine the possibility of nuclear war's effects on climate and sunlight. Yet the work of Soviet scientists like Sakharov, who support mutual rather than just Western nuclear disarmament, never appear in print.

The use of scientists to support Moscow's foreign policy is reminiscent of the use of Soviet psychiatry to support domestic policy. Western scientists, whether or not they support the nuclear winter theory, have noted that this Soviet subordination of science to government control will make a serious discussion of the implications of nuclear war very difficult.

TRUTH - MADE TO MEASURE

As part of a continuing series of actual case histories, the Editors present the following (in four chapters) to illustrate how Soviet or Soviet-inspired media manipulate Western news items.

Chapter 1

The Kenya Times (December 26, 1984) reports a controversial allegation about the so-called 'Operation Africa':

"A 'confidential report' compiled in London has accused the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of plotting to have Kenya's Dennis Akumu thrown out of the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) as Secretary-General. According to the report, some 1.4 million Kenyan shillings have been set aside for 'Operation Africa'."

Chapter 2

The US Embassy in Nairobi immediately denies that there is an 'Operation Africa' with a budget of 1.4 Kenyan shillings (approx. 100,000 US dollars):

"A front-page article published in the *Kenya Times* entitled 'CIA's Bid to Oust Akumu' is based upon a fabrication. . . . It is regrettable that it (*The Kenya Times*) could publish 'disinformation' of this

nature. There is no such activity as 'Operation Africa'.

Chapter 3

Nevertheless, the original allegation is replayed in Havana's *Prensa Latina* (January 5 1985) but with the Kenyan shillings now transformed into dollars:

"The spark for this situation was a *Kenya Times* article based on a confidential report secured by the London news media. The report reveals an 'Operation Africa' directed and financed by the CIA. . . . The report notes that US espionage services had assigned \$1.4 million to implement 'Operation Africa'.

Chapter 4

Not content with turning Kenyan shillings into dollars, Moscow shifts the decimal point in an English-language broadcast to Africa on January 24 1985:

"American special services have developed a special plan of subversive activities against it (the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity) codenamed Operation Africa. The *Kenya Times* quotes a confidential report discovered by African trade union activists and newsmen as saying that the CIA has allocated \$14 million to the operation."

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE PACIFIC REGION

The Soviet Union is stepping up its efforts to extend its influence in the Pacific region. Negotiations over granting Moscow access to Kiribati's maritime economic zone of two million square miles are an example. While persisting with attempts to establish diplomatic and commercial links, the Kremlin is resorting increasingly to Active Measures.

Three major front organisations have held conferences within the past eight months, focusing on the Pacific. This is an unusually high figure. The similarities of these meetings reveal a carefully co-ordi-

nated campaign.

- The 'International Conference on Peace and Security in East Asia and the Pacific' in Manila (30 November to 2 December 1984) was sponsored and organised by the World Peace Council (WPC), the main Soviet front organisation, and attended by representatives of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), the International Union of Students (IUS), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). A declaration called for the removal of US bases in the Philippines.

- The 'Asian and Ocean Trade Union Conference on Development and a New International Economic Order' in New Delhi (4 to 6 February 1985) was attended by 101 participants, representing 57 trade union organisations. The meeting was hosted by WFTU's affiliate, the All-Indian Trade Union Congress (AITUC). WFTU however was the driving force behind the event.

A message was sent to the Pacific region demanding "removal of all bases and the termination of the use of land, ocean and sky of the region by all nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships, submarines and aircraft". Support was given to the proposal of the Malaysian Foreign Minister for the establishment of a nuclear-free South East Asia. A message to the 12th World Youth Festival was adopted.

- The latest front meeting, the conference 'Trade Unions for Peace and Co-operation in Asia and Oceania' was held in the Mongolian capital Ulan Bator from 13 to 14 May 1985. Representatives from 32 trade union centres of 26 countries attended this event. Support was voiced

for Soviet "peace" proposals while the United States was heavily condemned for its "militarist policies".

It is not surprising that the significant build-up of Soviet naval and air power in the Far East and South East Asia, particularly its nuclear strength, was not once mentioned.

AN EMBARRASSING GUEST

We have learnt of a recent Soviet gaffe with the Indians, which had caused much embarrassment. On 27 April the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi gave a lunch for leading Indians as a run-up to VE Day Anniversary celebrations. The original guest list had included the Indian Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence and most of their senior advisers. All declined to attend and in the event the most important Indian guest was a Professor from the Jawaharlal Nehru University. After lunch the Soviet Ambassador Rykov rose to his feet and gave a long speech on predictable lines, about how the Soviet Union crushed the Nazis and won World War II. He sat down to thunderous applause and the Guest of Honour rose to reply. He declared that he simply could not accept what Rykov had said, which was offensive to him personally and to Indians generally. The Soviet Union may have had a part in beating the Nazis, but so had the Indians and indeed the Western Allies. But perhaps, even more important, the Indians had fought a long and bitter war here in the Far East against an equally tough enemy. (The clear implication was that not a single Soviet soldier had been involved at the time.) He sat down to stunned silence.

Although the press were present not a word appeared in the papers the following day. Nor has anything more

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